The financial trajectory of Everton has served as a textbook case of the structural risks of debt-financed Premier League expansion. Multiple regulatory breaches, resulting in consecutive Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) points deductions, exposed an acute liquidity crisis during at the heart of Farhad Moshiri’s tenure.
The formal completion of the takeover by the Friedkin Group (TFG) via Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited marked a critical moment in the club’s corporate governance. Now, precisely 550 days into the Friedkin administration, the audited accounts for 2024/25 – that take us six months into the TFG era – allow for a clinical evaluation of the financial strategy deployed to stabilise the club.
This analysis examines whether the recent reduction in losses represents genuine long-term sustainability or a series of clever corporate moves designed to swerve strict regulatory hurdles.
Prior liabilities: Understanding the financial mess before the takeover
Under the prior ownership, Everton’s business model relied heavily on unsecured shareholder loans and expensive, short-term third-party debt. This structure became unsustainable as escalating capital expenditure on the Hill Dickinson stadium project coincided with consecutive years of big operating deficits.
Detailed assessments from football finance analyst The Swiss Ramble show that loans from commercial lenders like Rights and Media Funding created massive pressure on the club’s day-to-day cash flow. High interest payments began swallowing up commercial revenues, meaning the club was frequently short of cash whenever player sales slowed down.
The bleeding years: Heavy losses before the group’s arrival
To see the true impact of the Friedkin Group’s changes, we must look at the two full seasons right before the takeover. The club’s balance sheet was weighed down by massive running costs and shrinking profits.
In the financial year ending 30 June 2024, Everton recorded an official loss of £53.2m. While this was lower than the £89.1m loss from the previous year, it confirmed that the club had lost far more money over a three-year period than the Premier League Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) allowed.
Player trading profits and squad value
To get emergency cash during these difficult seasons, Everton were forced to sell their best players. While selling these assets brought in quick transfer profits on paper, it lowered the overall value of the playing squad. As a result, player amortisation – the method of spreading a player’s transfer cost across the length of their contract – dropped significantly, showing that the squad was losing its long-term value.
Mounting debt and insolvency risks
By the end of the 2024 financial cycle, the club’s debts were a threat to its survival. Short-term liabilities grew quickly as stadium building costs continued to rise. Because there were no long-term loans in place to cover these costs, the club’s auditors had to issue warnings about Everton’s ability to continue operating, which made day-to-day business very difficult.
Restructuring the accounts: How TFG changed the numbers
The publication of the annual financial report for the year ending 30 June 2025 gave us our first look at TFG’s financial restructuring. The main headline showed that annual losses were cut drastically, falling from £53.2m down to an overall loss of £8.6m.
| Everton Financial Summary | 2023/24 (£m) | 2024/25 (£m) | Change (%) |
| Total Club Turnover | £186.9m | £196.7m | +5.2% |
| Operating Costs (Before Trading) | £199.0m | £210.5m | +5.8% |
| Profit on Player Sales | £48.5m | £31.3m | -35.5% |
| Internal Asset Disposals | £0.0m | £49.2m | N/A |
| Net Financial Year Loss | (£53.2m) | (£8.6m) | -83.8% |
Turning debt into shares
This large reduction in losses was achieved through corporate restructuring rather than standard business growth. TFG turned £450.7m of old shareholder debt into equity (shares). According to analysis by financial experts at The Esk, this move removed dangerous debt blocks from the balance sheet without breaking the Premier League’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) rules, raising the club’s net assets to £393.3m.
Fixing the stadium building debt
A major improvement for the club is the complete overhaul of its long-term borrowing. The total amount spent on the new stadium reached £813.0m by June 2025.
TFG stabilised this situation by landing a £350m, 30-year stadium financing package through JP Morgan Chase. This long-term loan allowed Everton to clear its expensive short-term debts, moving the liability into a steady payment structure lasting well into the future.
Strategic ‘carve-outs’: Internal asset sales under the microscope
A deeper look at the 2024/25 accounts shows that Everton’s everyday football business remains under heavy financial pressure. The headline loss of just £8.6m was heavily protected by an internal accounting manoeuvre.
During that financial year, Everton sold Everton Women and specific corporate stadium entities to Roundhouse Capital Holdings – the parent company owned directly by Dan Friedkin. This internal sale created a corporate profit of £49.2m for the club.
Data highlighted by The Swiss Ramble points out that if you remove this internal asset sale, Everton’s true operating loss for that period was actually closer to £57.8m. While this move provided vital accounting relief to make sure the club passed the Premier League’s domestic financial rules, it shows that Everton’s core matchday, TV, and commercial revenues were still not making enough money to cover costs on their own.
Regulatory shadow: The Burnley PSR ruling and compensation
While the internal restructuring has brought immediate safety, the club still operates under the shadow of past rule breaches. Football finance expert Kieran Maguire has highlighted the ongoing complexity regarding the legal battles and PSR rulings involving Burnley.
Maguire notes that while the Friedkin Group has cleared the immediate hurdles with the Premier League, the financial impact of potential compensation claims from rival clubs also remains an underlying risk. These historical legal disputes mean that TFG must keep a strict reserve of capital to protect the club from unexpected out-of-court settlements or financial penalties linked to the Moshiri era.
The efficiency plan: Wage cuts and operational savings
For the board and management team, the main goal over the last 18 months has been to cut the club’s wage bill. Historically, wages had swallowed up over 80% of the club’s total revenue, which is considered highly risky. In the latest financial cycle, staff costs were cut down to £152.1m.
This reduction was achieved by letting expensive player contracts run out and by outsourcing non-football operations like retail and catering. With these changes, the club’s wage-to-turnover ratio improved to 74%. While this means Everton are spending less on squad wages than many of their rivals, it sets tight limits on player recruitment and still requires quality scouting to keep the team competitive.
Verdict: The finances are safe, but true growth lies ahead
The initial 550 days of ownership by the Friedkin Group have achieved their main goal: stabilising Everton’s corporate balance sheet. By swapping dangerous short-term debt for a 30-year structured loan, turning massive shareholder debts into club shares, and using multi-club accounting moves, TFG protected Everton from immediate financial collapse.
However, the official data confirms this turnaround is still a work-in-progress. The business remains dependent on internal accounting mechanisms to balance its books, and legal loose ends from past seasons continue to require careful management.
True long-term financial health now depends entirely on bringing in much higher commercial revenues from the new stadium to create organic, unassisted growth.
For continuous updates on the club’s corporate status, visit ReadEverton.com. Official financial records can be verified using the registry at Companies House.
